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Abstract—The Bitcoin Lightning network is a mechanism to
enable fast and inexpensive off-chain Bitcoin transactions using
peer-to-peer (P2P) channels between nodes that can also be
composed into a routing path. Although the resulting possible
channel graphs are well-studied, there is no empirical data on
the network’s reliability in terms of being able to successfully
route payments at a given moment in time. In this paper we
address this gap and investigate two forms of availability that are
a necessary ingredient to achieve such reliability. We first study
the Lightning network’s ability to route payments of various sizes
to nearly every participating node, over most available channels.
We establish an inverse relationship between payment volume
and success rate and show that at best only about a third of
destination nodes can be successfully reached. The routing is
hampered by a number of possible errors, both transient and
permanent. We then study the availability of nodes in the network
longitudinally and determine how long-lived they are. Churn
in the network is actually low, and a considerable number of
nodes are hosted on cloud providers. By testing node liveness, we
find that the propagated network information is relatively often
stale, however, both for IP addresses and Tor onion addresses.
We provide recommendations how the Lightning network can
be improved, including considerations which trade-offs between
privacy and decentralization on the one hand and reliability on
the other hand should at least be reconsidered by the community
developing the Lightning network.
I. INTRODUCTION
More than ten years after the creation of the first public
blockchain, the number of transactions that Bitcoin can process
is orders of magnitude below that of classic payment systems
operated by banks and credit card providers. Regulatory issues
aside, this is one of the main factors that have held Bitcoin
back from becoming the globally accepted, decentralized
cryptocurrency that its developers meant it to be. A number
of solutions have been proposed to overcome Bitcoin’s perfor-
mance issues. Among the most interesting ones are those that
focus on bypassing the blockchain for most transactions and
use it as an anchor to keep track only of the result balance
of an entire set of off-chain transactions. Collectively, these
approaches are often known as Payment Channel Networks
(PCNs).
The Lightning Network is such a technology for Bitcoin.
It defines peer-to-peer (P2P) payment channels to facilitate
smaller transactions between two partnering blockchain par-
ticipants. Only the sum of all P2P transactions is written out
to the blockchain. By chaining channels together, one can also
‘route’ payments to participants to which no direct network
connection exists. The fees that channel operators charge are
very low compared to Bitcoin’s current fees. The design goals
of Lightning Network emphasize fast payments, with latencies
on the order of a fraction of a second. By keeping most trans-
actions off-chain, the Lightning Network also hopes to achieve
better privacy for users and a drastic reduction of required
storage space for the blockchain. However, there is a tension
between the design goals of reliability and decentralization.
To be acceptable to users as a common form of payment, the
Lightning Network must offer a high degree of reliability in the
sense of payments reaching their destination. An expressive
goal of the Lightning Network is to maintain a high degree of
decentralization [1]. As the Lightning Network is set up as P2P
network, where nodes are free to come and leave any time,
this means that availability, in different forms, is a prerequisite
for the network’s reliable functioning.
In this paper, we focus on two related forms of availability
that are a necessary condition for the latter. The first is
availability of channels at the time of payment, i.e., the
property that (composite) payment channels must be available
and capable of transporting a certain transaction volume to a
payment destination. This property can be directly measured
by running experiments in the network. The second form of
availability that we focus on is overall availability of nodes
in the network, in the sense that nodes must not go stale
over time: they should remain in the network for appropriate
periods, and they need to respond to queries such as requests to
connect or establish payment channels etc. This second form
of availability is, in fact, a constitutent of the first form; it
can also be described as a function of network composition.
However, as we will see, it can be measured only for a
part of the network due to the Lightning Network’s design.
This means that it is important to measure both forms of
availability as data for both allows us to more accurately gauge
the Lightning Network’s overall chances of routing payments
successfully. We acknowledge that further factors such as
security against attack, safety of operation such as recovering
from errors, etc. are all further important properties to fully
understand the Lightning Network. They are even harder to
measure at scale, however, and for this paper, we consider
them out of scope.
The Lightning Network network is now about four years
old. Previous work has investigated the properties of the graph
established by payment channels. However, these studies are
based on summary snapshots of channel information that is
propagated in the network over a longer period of time. In
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this sense, such studies consider a best-case picture, under
the assumption that all channels and responsible nodes are
actually really available. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no existing work that investigates the actual availability
properties of channels at the time a payment is attempted, nor
does data on the overall availability of network nodes exist. In
this work, we aim to close this gap. Our main contributions
are as follows:
a) Availability of payment routes: We determine the
Lightning Network’s ability to route payments of various,
plausible sizes to the intended destination. We construct a way
to probe the Lightning network for its ability to route payments
of different volumes. Our probing covers almost the entire
network. Our results establish a strong link between success
rate and payment volume. We identify both transient errors
(insufficiently funded channels) and intransient errors (such
as offline nodes) as the primary reasons for failing payments.
We find that only small payments have a reasonable chance to
be successful and that only a relatively small number of nodes,
and hence payment destinations, can actually be reached.
b) Availability of the network substrate: We investigate
the directly observable part of the Lightning network layer, i.e.,
those nodes that publish their network addresses. While the
network is well distributed over many Autonomous Systems,
many nodes are also run in the cloud or hosted by commercial
providers. We test the liveness of nodes and determine network
churn, which is a crucial factor for availability. While the latter
is relatively low, we find that propagated network information
is often stale, despite protocol mechanisms to eliminate it. This
contributes to overall poorer performance.
c) Recommendations: We conclude with a set of rec-
ommendations how the Lightning Network can be improved
and potentially developed into a viable payment option. While
some changes are mere technical extensions, others require to
rethink the degree of privacy desired for the network and the
level of centralization that one wants to accept.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section, we provide the relevant background to understand
how the Lightning Network works and is set up. We follow
this up with a discussion of related work in Section III. In
Section IV, we describe our choice of measurement methods
with respect to determining availability and reliability. We
present our results in Section V and give key take-ways.
We discuss potential improvements, including a rethinking of
privacy and centralization aspects, in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
The Lightning network is a representative in the class of
Payment Channel Networks (PCNs), which are one possible
answer to the scalability issues inherent to many blockchain
designs. Bano et al. provide a good introduction to blockchain
and the particular problem space of accelerating payments
in [2]. Several different approaches to PCNs are known;
Gudgeon et al. give an overview in [3].
a) Payment channel networks: In PCNs, a large num-
ber of transactions between a limited number of nodes can
be carried out ‘off-chain’, without sending the transactions
to the blockchain. Conventionally, the blockchain consensus
protocol is responsible for deciding which transactions are
considered correct and committed to the blockchain; herein
lies an important bottleneck. In a PCN, the consensus protocol
is typically only used to anchor the faithful creation and
deletion of payment channels between nodes. At the time
of writing, only Bitcoin’s Lightning Network is operated on
a main blockchain by default. In the following, we limit
ourselves to the Lightning Network.
b) Difference to blockchain network: Since PCNs oper-
ate on top of a blockchain, they are sometimes called Layer
2 solutions, built on top of the blockchain consensus protocol
(Layer 1), which itself runs over Layer 0, which is the protocol
that organizes the blockchain P2P network. We do not use the
layer terminology here to avoid confusion: two distinct pro-
tocol layers can also be identified for the Lightning Network
itself. One is responsible for the creation and management
of a P2P network of participating Lightning nodes, and one
is used to manage payment channels and forward payments.
Consequently, the substrate of the Lightning Network is a
P2P network that is distinct from the Bitcoin network that
maintains the blockchain: every Lightning Network node runs
a Bitcoin client as well, but the inverse is not true. The wallet
used for the Bitcoin client is also different from that for the
Lightning client. The network organization happens separately,
but in a similar way, using a discovery protocol based on a
gossiping mechanism. Nodes in the Lightning Network have
identifiers that are used in the Lightning protocol. These
are propagated between participating nodes. However, the
network addresses, i.e., IP and port or alternatively Tor onion
addresses, are not necessarily gossiped. A client participating
in the Lightning Network learns only the network addresses
of nodes that choose to reveal them. In the popular c-lightning
implementation, for instance, operators must manually enable
this. This is ostensibly done for privacy reasons. However, it
means that many nodes that are potential destinations are only
known via their identifier, and they can only be reached via the
node(s) that they choose to connect to themselves. All other
nodes in the network must hence find a route via the latter
nodes to send them a payment.
c) Payment channels: A node that is connected to an-
other Lightning node is expected to open a payment channel.
In essence, this is an agreement between the two nodes to
commit a certain amount of Bitcoin to the operation of this
channel. This initial commitment (the funding transaction) is
anchored in the Bitcoin blockchain with a special transaction,
where the funds are stored in a so-called multisignature
address that is controlled by both parties. Each party has
a balance in the channel, and both balances together make
up the channel capacity. The key idea is now that both
parties can send each other any number of transactions (so-
called commitment transactions) and update their respective
view of the balances, with newer commitment transactions
invalidating previous ones. As long as both parties behave
honestly, there is no need to involve the blockchain consensus
protocol. This only needs to happen when the channel is
closed again: the peers are reimbursed and the final balances
are written out to the blockchain. A channel can be closed
unilaterally or bilaterally. Commitment transactions are still
normal Bitcoin transactions; the obvious risk to address is the
misbehavior of a peer attempting to steal funds. Lightning
does this with a relatively complex mechanism that ensures
that only the most recent commitment transaction is ever
broadcast to the blockchain and accepted. Each peer holds
cryptographic proof that can be used against the other side
in case this condition is violated, i.e., one party sent an older
commitment transaction to the blockchain. In such a case, the
funds of the misbehaving side are awarded to the victim of
the attempted fraud. The exact mechanics are described in a
whitepaper [1]; implementation details are given in an RFC-
style document [4].
d) Sending payments: Payments in Lightning are funda-
mentally different from Bitcoin transactions. A receiver must
create a so-called invoice and make it available to the sender.
With the invoice, the sender can try to make the payment.
Channels may be chained to allow sending payments to any
destination to which a valid route (chain of channels) can be
determined. This is achieved with so-called Hashed Timelock
Contracts. The idea here is that the sender determines a path
over a number of channels (source routing). Each node on this
path is only aware of predecessor (incoming payment) and
successor (outgoing payment); this is the same principle as in
the Tor network (onion routing). To set up the entire routed
payment, the node that is the final destination of a payment
generates a secret, random value and sends it as a hash value
to the source of the payment as part of the invoice. A chain
of payments along the channels is created based on this hash
value. Once the destination redeems the final transaction, the
preimage of the hash is revealed in such a way that, in reverse,
every node on the path can also redeem the funds they used to
make the payment possible. The invoice mechanism provides
a very useful way for us to probe the network: by generating
invalid invoices, we can determine the validity and capacity
of routes without a need to make actual payments.
e) Routing: To allow nodes to identify paths through
the network, the Lightning Network broadcasts every known
channel between nodes. This only needs to involve the channel
identifiers and the identifiers (public keys) of source and
destination nodes, not their network addresses. The balances of
channels are not broadcast for privacy reasons. Consequently,
it is entirely possible that a routed payment fails because one of
the channels in the chain does not have the necessary capacity
or the sender is currently insufficiently funded as the channel
has already executed too many outgoing transactions. This
is signalled back to the source with an error code once the
payment is tried. We make use of this behavior when probing
the network: it allows us to test which transaction volumes are
supported by the network and how many nodes can be reached
in relation to the transaction volume.
III. RELATED WORK
While the Bitcoin network and a few other blockchain
networks have been the subject of measurement studies be-
fore (e.g., [5], [6], [7]), PCNs have received less attention.
Several websites exist that visualize the information that can
be obtained from running a Lightning node and offer so-
called ‘public snapshots’ (e.g., 1ml.com, lndexplorer.com).
Such data is used in a number of publications, e.g., [8], [9],
[10], [11]. A drawback of this kind of data source is that it
is unclear whether outdated information (inactive nodes) has
been removed; it is also unknown from which or how many
vantage point(s), and at which time, the data was raised.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous academic
publication that analyzes the composition of the Lightning
P2P network or identifies the Lightning Network’s efficacy
in terms of routing. The work that is probably closest to
ours is published by Decker in the Blockstream company
blog [12]. The author describes a reachability experiment that
also uses the probe module of the c-lightning implementation.
However, the probing is limited to one-hop reachability tests.
The author identifies just 829 nodes with publicly announced
network addresses. At the time of measurement (November
2019), 27.4k channels were known, with a total capacity of
just 827 BTC. Disregarding nodes without active channels,
Decker identifies 65% of nodes as reachable, i.e., responsive
to the probe and a working destination for payments. He also
briefly investigates transaction latency and stuck payments.
Unlike our work, there is no systematic attempt to explore
the capability of the network to transport payments of various
volumes nor reachability over routes consisting of several
channels.
Most related work studies only the channel graph that
is propagated in the network, but not actual availability by
measurement. The graph’s robustness properties have been
investigated several times, including its small-world and scale-
free properties. Martinazzi and Flori study the graph for the
first year of the Lightning Network’s existence [8], relying on
public snapshots and determining graph properties, especially
scale-freeness. Seres et al. [11] use public snapshots from
January 2019. At the time, the channel graph consisted of
16.6k channels; the Lightning Network had a capacity of 540
BTC. Naturally emerging scale-free networks are typically
very robust to random failure but not to targeted attack.
The authors confirm this for Lightning as well by simulating
the removal of nodes with many channels. An important
conclusion is that the network needs dedicated protection
against Denial-of-Service attacks where the attackers go after
the most important nodes. Similar results are also presented
in [13], [14], [15], with the latter concluding that the Lightning
network exhibits a core-periphery structure.
Rohrer et al. [16] derive the channel graph from running
two nodes in the network themselves and dumping the iden-
tified channels. They also establish the small-world property
and the scale-freeness of the graph but bolster their result with
robust statistical tests, which is an absolute requirement to
identify scale-free networks1. The authors provide a count of
vertices in the channel graph, which rose from 1.5k to 2.4k
between November 2018 and February 2019. They then design
an attack to make channels temporarily unavailable by creating
HTLCs such that nodes on a route must wait for the time locks
to expire.
Herrera-Joancomarti et al. [18] design an attack to deter-
mine the balances of Lightning channels, which are meant
to be confidential between the endpoints to increase privacy.
They show a proof-of-concept on the Bitcoin testnet that
involves the repeated probing of a channel with the help of
invalid payments. While the design of the probing is similar
to our approach, we are not concerned with attacks in this
paper. In [19], the same authors build on the above attack
to temporarily lock the channel balance of targeted, central
nodes, making them unavailable for the rest of the network.
Some work analyzes the economics of operating a Lightning
node. Ersoy et al. [9] design an algorithm to maximize profit
from operating a Lightning channel. They evaluate their algo-
rithm using empirical data downloaded from 1ml.com. In [10],
the authors investigate whether running a Lightning Network
node is economically rational. They simulate transactions on
the Lightning Network based on graph snapshots and data on
transaction fees from [16]. Based on the current channel graph
and some (strong) assumptions of user behavior, they answer
the question in the negative.
Finally, several authors devise solutions to remove potential
bottlenecks in payment routing, e.g., [20], [21]. These are not
necessarily specific to the Lightning network.
IV. METHODOLOGY
We explain our methods to test the availability of payments
routes and the overall node availability in the network.
A. Availability of channels payment routes
The first part of our methodology addresses the first form of
availability we described in Section I. The goal is to measure
systematically how many payment channels and payment
routes support a payment of a given volume and how many
destination nodes can be reached by routing payments through
the network, over channels of various lengths.
We test channels by running a Lightning node in the cloud,
specifically a DigitalOcean location in San Francisco. We refer
to this node as Node A. The node has both IPv4 and IPv6
connectivity.We fund our own node with the equivalent of
about US$ 120 and open initial channels to well-connected
nodes. We choose the two nodes that have the highest number
of public open channels and do not reject our request to
create a channel with sufficient funding. One node accepts
our funding of the Bitcoin equivalent of US$ 100; the other
only accepts a funding of US$ 20. At the start of our probing,
one node is the source point of 867 channels; the other of 840.
c-lightning provides the ability to add user-defined plugins
to extend its functionality. One such plugin is the probe
1It is a premature conclusion to call a graph scale-free based only on visual
inspection of a double-log plot as many other authors did; see [17] for details.
module, which allows a user to test a payment to another node.
It achieves this by sending a payment with an invalid (random)
payment hash. When the payment arrives at its destination,
the recipient is unable to redeem it and returns an Unknown
Payment Details error. This error indicates that the reachability
experiment was actually successful. If the payment cannot be
routed through the specified route, then a different error will
be returned (see below). An advantage of this kind of probing
is that it allows to test payments without actually spending
Bitcoin.
We modify the probe module to support testing the avail-
ability of channels for payments of a certain volume. We
do this by breadth-first search. Using the method described
above, the modified plugin tests payments through as many
channels as it can reach. It first tries to route a payment through
the channels it has open with the initial peers. If these are
successful, it attempts to route the payment through each of
the channels that each of the respective peers has open, except
for those channels that have already been tested. It continues
in this breadth-first manner until no more channels can be
reached. We cannot probe every single channel in existence:
some are unreachable from our initial nodes. To test them,
we would have to iteratively establish channels to (potentially
many) other nodes. As there is no guarantee they would accept
payments of the volumes we choose, we regard this alternative
methodology as having diminishing returns. Furthermore, we
note that payments may also fail due to transient reasons (see
Section V-A).
We begin our experiment on 2019-11-03 and end it on
2019-11-25. For each attempted payment (reflecting a com-
position of channels), we make at most two payment attempts
and store whether one of the two attempts was ‘successful’
or we could not recover from an error. Since each channel
direction has a different balance and potentially different
fees for forwarding, we probe each channel direction. As
transaction volumes, we choose the Bitcoin equivalent for
US$ 0.01, US$ 1, US$ 5, US$ 10, US$ 50 and US$ 100 at the
time of the experiment’s start.
B. Availability of nodes in the P2P network
The second set of measurements addresses the second
form of availability we discussed in Section I. The goal is
to establish how many nodes whose network addresses are
propagated through the network actually reply to attempts to
contact them. This also allows us to compute churn in the
network. As explained in section II, measurements of the
Lightning network layer are limited to nodes that consent to
the propagation of their network addresses by other peers.
1) Input data: We have two input data sources, which
we use for different purposes. First, we have access to data
raised by developers of the c-lightning client. The listnodes
RPC call provides a mapping between the node identifier
(node ID) and known network address. These can be any
combination of IPv4, IPv6, and Tor onion addresses. The data
set is split into days. For each day, it lists the node IDs and last
known addresses on the day or prior. The data set covers the
period 2019-09-15 through 2019-11-30. In addition to node
information, we also obtain the known channels (with source
and destination nodes) of each day.
According to [12], stale nodes, i.e., nodes with no active
channels, should be purged with the client’s default settings.
This view of the network would be in contrast to public
visualization sites such as 1ml.com, which do not employ this
purging and consequently overestimate the network size. The
specification of the Lightning Network protocol also mentions
pruning stale nodes and channels explicitly. We would hence
expect most nodes to be responsive. In order to test the liveness
of nodes ourselves, we install a further Lightning node in the
network of the University of Sydney, which we refer to as
Node B. The university network has only IPv4 available. We
fund a channel with 0.001 BTC, i.e., about US$ 10 at the time
of the experiment. We run the node from 2020-02-18 onwards.
As the node has only one channel, we note that this may
mean the node receives fewer announcements via the dicovery
gossip protocol than nodes with many active channels (and
hence connected peers). We return to this in Section V-B. We
also use the listnodes RPC call of c-lightning to dump node
information.
We map the IP addresses of Lightning nodes to Autonomous
Systems (ASes) using pyasn in conjunction with Routeviews
routing information at the corresponding time. We use Team
Cymru’s WHOIS service (v4.whois.cymru.com) to map the
AS number to the operator name and registration with a
Regional Internet Registry (RIR). This gives us the name of
the network hosting a node.
2) Testing liveness: For nodes learned with our own Light-
ning Node B, we use two methods to check their liveness
and reachability. For IPv4 nodes, we use the extremely fast
Internet scanner zmap [22] to test whether they respond on
the allocated port. This scan takes place from the University
of Sydney and takes only two minutes. Almost all nodes
use the Lightning default port (9735); we hence limit our
investigations to this port.
A significant number of nodes publish a .onion network
address, which refers to a Tor hidden service. Such nodes are
only reachable via rendezvous points using the Tor anonymiza-
tion network. We deploy a Tor daemon on our server and
connect via the c-lightning client to test their liveness.
3) Limitations: Only a subset of nodes publishes their net-
work addresses. This may introduce a bias: it is conceivable,
for example, that operators running the Lightning software
on a public server (e.g., a VPS) are more likely to publish
their network address than private users in a home. This is
particularly true if they aim at making a profit by collecting
fees from their channels. A similar argument holds for Tor
hidden services, which should ideally also be longer-lived. We
keep this limitation in mind when discussing our results.
C. Ethical considerations and reproducibility
Although it is deployed on Bitcoin’s mainnet, the Light-
ning Network network is still in a testing stage. Developers
monitor the network and occasionally probe it for metrics like
reachability [12]. This monitoring is one of our data sources.
Internet scans and interactions with cryptocurrency networks,
which constitute another part of our methodology, have been
cleared by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of
Sydney. We employ several guiding principles to minimize
the impact of our measurement on the Lightning Network.
We refrain from attempts to include every single channel in
our breadth-first search as this would imply many additional
channels would have to be opened. We also limit ourselves to
just two probes for payments.
We support open science and will make both our source
code and our data available publicly available.
V. RESULTS
We first present our results on availability of payment
routing and then the results on overall availability of nodes
in the network.
A. Availability of channels
According to our data source from the c-lightning devel-
opers, which collected daily snapshots, between 31.4k and
31.8k channels existed between 2020-11-03 and 2020-11-
25 and were not stale. Although we do not attempt a full
combinatorial testing of all possible routes (see Section IV),
our own probes from our initial, well-connected hop cover
a significant amount of the propagated channels: 30.7k are
reached by the probes. This corresponds to 49.2k channel
directions. Note that we do not reach the theoretically possible
61.4k directions: many nodes have only a single channel open,
and if a probe is not able to traverse the channel to a given
endpoint, then it is not possible to test the reverse direction,
either. While the overall number is high and seems to imply
that reachability in the Lightning Network is very good in
principle, the picture changes dramatically when looking at
the success rate of payments.
1) Success of payments: According to our data from the
c-lightning developers, between 4826 and 4950 nodes are
observed during our experiment period. In our experiments,
we attempt payments to a total of 4626 unique nodes, i.e., we
cover between 93.5%-95.9% of existing nodes. However, the
success rate of attempted payments varies between 15.32%
and 72.09%, depending on the payment volume. The number
of nodes that we reach with a payment is also considerably
lower than the number of nodes we attempt to send a payment
to: just 2055. This number is the union of all unique nodes
reached over all probes of various payment volumes (Table I).
We can never reach more than roughly at third of all nodes,
independent of payment volume. Note that the relatively long
duration of our experiment implies that some nodes that were
reachable during tests with one payment volume may be
unreachable again for the next, or vice versa.
We observe a strong inverse relationship of successful
payments to the volume used, which we summarize in Table I.
While by far the most very small payments of US$ 0.01
are successful overall (72%), we still reach only 35% of
nodes overall. The numbers for successful payments drop
0500
1000
1500
2000
2 4 6
Minimum route length
N
um
be
r o
f n
od
es
Figure 1. Minimum number of hops to reach nodes.
Table I
SUCCESS RATE FOR PAYMENTS AND unique NODES REACHED.
Amount (US$ ) % payments % nodes # nodes
0.01 71.92 35.24 1630
1 57.82 35.19 1628
5 44.06 25.66 1187
10 44.15 33.72 1560
50 30.93 9.22 459
100 17.30 4.82 223
immediately when we increase the volume to US$ 1, however
the number of reached nodes stays almost the same. Evidently,
a sufficient number of payment channels are alive and func-
tioning to enable this volume. While 35% of nodes seems to
be an upper number in terms of reachability for practically
useful payments, we note that some of the payment routes are
longer than others, meaning that such routes imply a higher
overall chance of failure. The numbers deteriorate fast with
higher payment volumes. Payments of US$ 50 and above do
not reach any significant number of nodes any more. It is
unclear from our observations why more nodes can be reached
for US$ 10 than for US$ 5; however, we emphasize the high
rate of transient errors in channels, which we explore below.
We also compute how many hops are needed to reach the
destination. Figure 1 shows this. Even with just two outgoing
channels, it is possible to reach the vast majority of nodes
via two or three hops. Note that the principle of onion routing
requires two hops from the source, i.e., one ‘intermediate’ and
one ‘exit’ node before the final hop (the destination).
2) Reasons for failing payments: Table II summarizes the
errors we determined across all payments. The most common
error was a temporary channel failure. This error is reported
when a channel direction has temporarily insufficient funds
available. This can be a result of previous transactions through
the channel that have been locked. The error indicates the
same payment may succeed through the channel at a later
time. The next most common error was Unknown Next Peer.
This indicates a hop along the intended payment route did not
have a connection to the next node. Less than 1% of payments
returned a channel disabled error. Other errors occurred very
rarely; we attribute them to the client having slightly out of
date information about some parts of the network. Payment
Table II
BREAKDOWN OF ERRORS.
Result Count %
Temporary Channel Failure 47341 31.58
Unknown Peer 23839 15.90
Channel Disabled 1203 0.80
Payment Timeout 336 0.22
Insufficient Fee 192 0.13
Expiry Too Soon 142 0.09
Other 267 0.18
timeouts are particularly rare. These errors indicate that the
payment has taken longer than four minutes to return. When
these errors occur they lock the funds in place untl the payment
returns, and in some situations channels have to be closed
to recover the funds. This can be a costly (due to Bitcoin
transaction fees) and lengthy process.
Figure 2 breaks the errors down by payment volume, group-
ing rare errors together. While the percentages of errors vary
by volume, the relative proportions are very similar between
volumes. We find that probed channels generally either do
not return the Unknown Peer error at all, or they return it
consistently. Of the more than 30k channels we probe, 6550
return the error on every probe. This suggests that over the
probing period of a couple of weeks, the nodes at either ends
of these channels were either infrequently or never connected.
Similarly, we also find that there are 1780 nodes over which
we cannot route a single payment.
These numbers seem so high that we verify them with an
alternative client after our main measurements. We temporarily
connect a second client to the network and retry payments to
the endpoints of channels where we received the Unknown
Peer. The second client is successful in routing payments
to about 20% of these nodes. While this seems a slight
improvement, it still validates the overall frequency of this
error.
We note that there is a risk for nodes that remain discon-
nected over longer periods of time while keeping channels
open. The respective endpoints of the channels may unilater-
ally try to close the channel and publish a signed transaction
with an old channel balance. If this remains undetected for a
longer period of time (for example, 24 hours), then the funds
may be stolen without recourse. The concept of ‘watchtowers’
has been proposed to warn potentially affected nodes2.
Key take-aways. Although many channels are reachable
in principle, the Lightning Network is actually not capable
of routing larger payments. Even modest payments of just
US$ 10 succeed only in less than half of all attempts; for
larger payments around US$ 50, the success rate drops to
below 20%. No experiment run was ever able to reach more
than a third of the destination nodes. At present, the Lightning
Network is not capable of supporting the kinds of payments
that would be needed to support activities such as shopping for
everyday goods. This is due to insufficient funding of channels:
2https://hedgetrade.com/what-are-lightning-networks-watchtowers/
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Figure 2. Errors during payments broken down by payment volume (US$ ).
even though many channels exist, they are often not able to
forward a payment due to congestion: at the time we attempt a
payment, it exceeds the channel’s currently available balance.
A further, important reason is that the node corresponding
to a channel’s endpoint is unavailable, often for long periods
of time. This suggests that channel management could be
improved.
B. Overall node availability on the network
More nodes in the network imply more available channels
and a higher overall availability. We hence determine the
network’s growth over time. Node churn is an important factor,
however, as nodes should ideally stay well-connected in the
network to sustain the overall reachability. We hence also
measure how long-lived nodes are. Network location is an
important factor related to this: nodes that run on publicly
reachable servers can be expected to contribute more to overall
reachability due to their uptime.
1) Network growth: Figure 3 shows the development of the
Lightning Network according to the data from the c-lightning
developers. We identify a slow but stable growth between
2019-09-15 and 2019-11-30: from 4558 Node IDs to 4981, i.e.,
nearly 10% in 2.5 months. This corresponds to significantly
fewer network addresses: just over 1000 IPv4 addresses are
publicly known, and nearly as many onion addresses. This
means many nodes do keep the privacy feature of not propa-
gating their network address enabled.
Interestingly, IPv6 addresses are rare—we never find more
than about 50. Using a second protocol can potentially improve
overall availability. A number of nodes publish an IP address
and an onion address. For example, 79 nodes choose to do this
on 2019-09-15. This numbers grows to 182 by 2019-11-30.
However, doing this breaks the anonymity of the respective
NodeID as a receiver of payments. Either operators are not
aware of this, or indifferent to it, or their primary goal is not
their own anonymity but merely to help making forwarded
payments as anonymous as possible.
We also determine the network addresses from the point
of view of our Node B as of 2020-02-18 12:00 GMT, i.e.,
2.5 months later. At the indicated time, our node is aware of
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Figure 3. Development of the network layer: node IDs and network addresses.
4938 unique nodes (identified by their node ID). If we assume
the Lightning Network maintained its growth after 2019-11-
30, and assuming the growth rate remained about the same,
this would imply our node is aware of about 90% of nodes
in the network. For the 4938 nodes that Node B is aware of,
we identify 2296 unique IPv4 addresses (a further 45 are in
IANA-reserved prefixes, i.e., invalid).
Our data from 2019 shows a relatively high number of
onion addresses in the network until 2019-11-30. Our Node B
identifies unique 1885 onion addresses on 2020-02-19, which
indicates a definite growth since the end of our first observation
period on 2019-11-30.
Our node set of 2020-02-19 11:30 GMT, which we obtain
via the listnodes RPC call, contains 1882 onion addresses
corresponding to 1843 nodes. 410 addresses use the older
v2 addresses. These addresses use SHA1 and RSA-1024
cryptography, which offer less security against impersonation
attacks and are slowly being phased out. Hidden services of
v2 are also known to leak more information to Tor’s hidden
directory services, an undesirable property. However, overall
the choice of v2 addresses is not too concerning at this time,
and the fact that the majority uses the newer v3 services is in
fact encouraging.
2) Liveness and churn: We first use our data set from 2019
to check how long-lived nodes are. Comparing the node IDs
from 2019-09-15 to the ones from 2019-10-15, we find that
many remain in the network. Of 4558 nodes on 2019-09-15,
4038 are still there one month later. A further month on, this
number drops to 3197, however.
Using our Node B, we estimate liveness and churn over the
node’s observation period. Note that we do this for network
addresses, not the public key-based identifiers. Of the 2251
public IP addresses where the Lightning software runs on port
9735, 73 are in IP ranges that are on our blacklist of networks
that do not wish to be scanned. We choose the remaining 2178
addresses to scan TCP port 9735 and test their liveness. Only
875 nodes, corresponding to 859 IP addresses, respond on the
port. This is a surprise as we use a version of c-lightning that
is meant to prune stale nodes; hence the client should have a
much more accurate picture of the network.
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Figure 4. Network churn within three days.
We compute the IPv4 churn. We use the node set of Node
B at the same time (2020-02-18 12:00 GMT) as the reference
set of live and unreachable nodes. We then compare this to
the node sets at the following times: 10, 30, and 60 minutes
later; 2, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, and 24 hours later; and 36, 48, 60,
and 72 hours later.
We find that there is very little change in the network in
terms of nodes remaining reachable or unreachable. Although
two nodes become unreachable in the first ten minutes, 837
nodes are still reachable under the same IP address and port
even after 72 hours (more than 95%). Figure 4 summarizes
changes that occur over time. In the first 8 hours, there is very
little activity: a handful of nodes (by node ID) disappear from
the node set or become unreachable, but similar numbers also
become reachable again. Larger changes become apparent only
later. There is a jump in nodes that become unreachable after
12 hours, although a similar jump also occurs for nodes that
become reachable. Overall, the network seems quite stable,
and the churn is not a strong explanation for the observed
stale addresses.
We choose the onion nodes for a manual liveness test as
well. We enable use of the Tor daemon for our c-lightning
client and attempt to connect to each onion address in turn.
This is a lengthy process (13 hours). We successfully connect
to 1297 of the addresses and fail in 546 cases. This indicates
that onion addresses also suffer from the problem of staleness.
3) Network locations: We map the public IPv4 addresses
to their corresponding ASes. We choose the 18th of 2019-09,
2019-10, 2019-11, and 2020-02 for this analysis. Table III
presents the results. We first observe that the Lightning IP ad-
dresses are spread over a wide range of Autonomous Systems
Numbers, and this number is increasing. In 2019-09, about
900 Lightning IPs are distributed over more than 250 ASNs
(although we note that large corporations sometimes hold
several ASNs). The top 5 AS owners between September and
November 2019 are largely the same. We find hosting/cloud
providers such as Google, DigitalOcean, Amazon, and OVH;
however, we also find Internet access providers (Cogent,
Comcast) with significant share. It would not be a surprise
that Lightning nodes are run on cloud or hosting servers. This
has been well documented for the Bitcoin network itself [6].
The data from 2020-02 seem to show a reversal of the
top-ranking entries. Cogent and Comcast together account
for about 11% of the public IPv4 addresses. However, this
changes when we filter out those IP addresses that zmap did
not identify as live. Although Cogent remains in the first
place, the remainder is made up of hosters. The tentative
conclusion we offer here is that the network is moving towards
central infrastructure, while at the same time spreading over
more ASes and keeping a significant share of operators with
classic ISP-based Internet access. This finding would be very
consistent with the relatively low churn we estimate.
Key take-aways. The Lightning Network seems to grow at
a moderate but steady pace. This is a good result for overall
availability as every new node will also contribute at least one
new channel. The high number of nodes that do not propagate
their network addresses is remarkable: it means that nodes
that wish to establish more channels are actually limited in
their choice, which is contrary to the goal of decentralization.
The network churn is quite low, which is a good result. We
find that cloud providers feature prominently among the most
important Autonomous Systems contributing to the network,
which is indicative of centralization. The number of stale
nodes is high, despite the protocol aiming to eliminate stale
nodes from the network view. Even Tor nodes are frequently
stale, hinting at operators not desiring to make a contribution
to overall network stability and availability but rather focusing
on their own privacy in more short-lived participation. Overall,
the node availability on the network leaves considerable room
for improvement as better availability would help sustain
reachability.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the previous section, we identified a number of properties
concerning the reliability of the Lightning Network network
in terms of availability of payment routes and overall node
availability in the network. We offer several thoughts based
on our results in the context of the overarching goal of
the network, which is to enable reliable payments while
remaining decentralized. These two goals are conflicted. In our
considerations, we lean towards favouring reliable payments
over decentralization and privacy. Ultimately, this is a question
of which business model the Lightning Network should operate
under, which is a question for the community to decide.
a) Ability to route payments: The ability of the network
to reach nodes via source routing (combining channels) is dis-
appointing. Only small payments have a reasonable chance of
success: 72% of payments of US$ 0.01 and 58% of US$ 1 were
successful. However, these payments still reached only 35%
of nodes at best. The success rate of payments beyond US$ 50
was very low. A key reason for this is that channels simply do
not have enough funding—transient errors due to insufficient
balances are the most common. On the face of it, the Lightning
Network will need to win users who are willing to invest more
funds into channels. Naturally, this is a chicken-egg problem
as lack of user base is a disincentive for investment. Investment
Table III
AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS CONTAINING LIGHTNING NODES WITH PUBLIC IPV4 ADDRESSES, WITH TOP 5.
Time IPs Spread 1st (# nodes) 2nd (# nodes) 3rd (# nodes) 4th (# nodes) 5th (# nodes)
2019-09 901 258 ASNs Google (116) Comcast (50) DigitalOcean (45) Cogent (37) OVH (21)
2019-10 1.1k 305 ASNs Google (121) DigitalOcean (57) Comcast (56) Cogent (49) Amazon (28)
2019-11 1.3k 337 ASNs Google (123) DigitalOcean (70) Cogent (63) Comcast (62) Amazon (35)
2020-02 2.3k 471 ASNs Cogent (141) Comcast (133) DigitalOcean (116) Amazon (78) Google (78)
2020-02 (live) 858 249 ASNs Cogent (114) DigitalOcean (59) Amazon (38) OVH (32) Contabo (29)
by companies and appropriate marketing campaigns may be
one way to address this; however, such undertakings tend to
de-emphasize decentralization.
b) Extending the protocols: A good part of our exper-
iments failed due to the long-lived unavailability of a node
representing a channel endpoint. As we actually measure
relatively little churn in the network, at least in the public
part of the network, the question is whether the Lightning
protocol should be improved to eliminate stale information
faster. Our results show that much stale information is kept
by clients, despite a pruning mechanism in the popular c-
lightning client. One can conceive a probing protocol that
simulates payments (without requesting a particular amount)
to test channel and node availability. Our recommendation is
to add such a maintenance protocol to the network.
c) The right threat model for privacy: The argument
against revealing public IP information is that it harms the
privacy of operators, whose node IDs can be linked to their
network address. This is likely to harm availability and actually
pave the way towards more centralization as publicly known
nodes are the only ones that new, joining nodes can connect
to. The unavailability of more publicly known IP addresses
also counteracts the goal of eliminating stale information as it
makes it impossible to test a node’s (IP) availability directly.
We believe that the feature of hiding the network address is
based on a threat model that is inappropriate for Lightning
Network. An IP address by itself does not reveal the operator’s
identity, but a hoster or ISP will be able to map an IP address to
a real person. Companies generally release customer data only
to law enforcement agencies or other entities that can request
such information, unless they are compromised and suffer a
data breach. Hence, the only adversary that makes sense is
one who falls into one of these two categories. Also note that,
depending on the gravity of the underlying cause for a request
to release customer information, it is conceivable that the
requesting entities may be able to approach the hoster of a ‘hub
node’, i.e., the node with many channels and corresponding
knowledge to which nodes and IP address they map—even if
that hub is located in another jurisdiction. In such a case, the
IP addresses of operators that have disabled the propagation
of their network addresses is also given away. In summary, we
believe that hiding the network address is of little benefit for
the majority of the network while harming its development.
Ideally, payments are routed in an onion-style anwyay, which
should already achieve a high level of privacy for many users
and operators.
d) Business model and centralization: The above consid-
erations imply that the corresponding design decisions should
depend on the business model that Lightning operators wish
to follow. Although the authors of [10] state that operating
a node is currently not economically viable, this does not
rule out that a dedicated, different business model may make
Lightning both more performant and more profitable. Better
funded channels, for instance, may attract more users and
operators, hence improving the network’s performance and
ability to route payments, which in turn may attract further
users and investment. The community should engage in a
discussion which direction the network should take.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have contributed a study of Bitcoin’s
Lightning network nearly four years after its inception. We
focus on two aspects of availability that have seen little to no
previous investigation, namely availability of payment routes
and overall node availability in the network. These are neces-
sary ingredients for the network to achieve reliable sending of
payments. We find that we can theoretically construct paths
to nearly all channels and nodes in the network. However, in
practice routing payments fails much too often, in particular
when trying to send larger payments in excess of US$ 50. The
reasons have to do with the network’s composition and slow
reaction to stale information. This leads us to consider the
question which changes to the Lightning Network’s structure,
protocols, and business model could be made to improve
its overall usefulness. While decentralization is a worthwhile
goal, some improvements may well be easier to implement
against the background of a business model involving central
hubs. However, Bitcoin’s philosophy was always one of de-
centralization and enabling better privacy for digital payments.
This remains a central tenet for many users and operators. We
believe our findings should at least generate a discussion which
direction the network should take.
We note that research on the Lightning Network should
not end even if a new, more investment-based business model
is adopted and leads to more centralization and less privacy.
Assuming the network begins to carry sizable volumes, it will
be an interesting research question whether attacks against
hub availability benefit the attackers sufficiently in terms of
stealing channel funds or destroying user trust, for example.
As a cryptocurrency and community-based project, a growing
Lightning Network should be continued to be monitored.
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